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WYOMING V. HOUGHTON:  RETHINKING THE COURT’S VIEW OF 
A PASSENGER’S PRIVACY INTERESTS ON THE ROAD 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine.  Your husband is driving you and your child down the street one 
night, when you are suddenly pulled over by a police officer on a routine 
traffic stop.  Imagine.  The officer approaches the car and after questioning 
your husband, he notices a syringe used for drugs in your husband’s pocket.  
Imagine.  The officer is now searching the entire car including your families’ 
belongings for other drug paraphernalia.  Stop imagining because this is 
reality.  This scenario presents the issue in Wyoming v. Houghton, which came 
before the Supreme Court as a matter of first impression: what are the rights of 
a passenger in an automobile, when there is probable cause to search the car?1  
In a reversal of the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that a police officer, with probable cause, is entitled to search any space 
in a car that may contain the objects of the search, regardless of ownership of 
the container.2  This case note explores and critiques the Court’s Houghton 
decision on two bases.  First, this note will look at the failure by the Court to 
adhere to traditional notions of probable cause.  Second, the casenote will 
explore the Court’s presumption that it is reasonable, despite the fact that an 
officer is on notice that the purse did not actually belong to the driver, to 
search the entire automobile. 
This casenote will begin by looking at the historical background of the 
Fourth Amendment.  It will then explore the case of Wyoming v. Houghton, the 
case at issue.  The casenote will then focus on the authors’ analysis of the 
decision by the Court. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Traditional Approaches 
1. Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
 
 1. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999). 
 2. Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1998); Houghton, see supra note 1. 
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seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”3  The protections 
established by the Fourth Amendment include the general right that the police 
may not search areas in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
without probable cause, whether or not a warrant is required.4  The Supreme 
Court defines probable cause as a “substantial basis for concluding that a 
search would uncover evidence of a wrongdoing”5 from which “a man of 
reasonable caution”6 would believe a crime has been committed.7  In essence 
the probable cause standard is a compromise between two competing interests: 
safeguarding of citizens from arbitrary and unreasonable invasions of privacy, 
and the government’s interest in efficient and effective law enforcement.8 
2. Searches of an Automobile9 
The Court has determined that under certain circumstances, a warrant is 
neither needed, nor required to effectuate a valid search or seizure.10  A search 
conducted after a valid stop of an automobile is one such circumstance which a 
warrant is not required.  But the scope of a warrantless search is “no narrower 
or broader than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by 
probable cause.”11 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 4. Illinois v. Gates, 463 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 237. 
 7. Id.; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (holding probable cause existed 
to search a car where the evidence rested in the driver’s own admission of possessing illegal 
alcohol). 
 8. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176. 
 9. The issue before the Court in Houghton does not examine the facts under the guise of 
New York v. Belton where the Court held that a valid search incident to an arrest in an automobile 
may be extended to the passenger compartment of the car, nor does this decision fall under the 
guise of inventory searches, as per Illinois v Lafayette.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 459, 460 
(1981) (finding a bright line rule for a search incident to an arrest allowing the officer to search 
any and every part of a the passenger compartment after a custodial arrest where the search and 
the arrest happen within temporal proximity); Illinois v Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (inventory 
searches); see also Chimel v. Califronia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (general search incident to arrest 
rule). 
 10. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (holding that “the Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches 
and seizures and it is a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). 
 11. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982). 
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The foundation for searching an automobile was set in Carroll v. United 
States.12  In that case, the police stopped a car of a known bootlegger, on a 
stretch of highway that is known for bootlegging traffic.13  The police 
proceeded to rip up the car’s upholstering in a search for illegal bottles of 
liquor.14  The search subsequently revealed sixty-eight bottles of liquor, which 
were banned under the National Prohibition Act.15  The case was appealed to 
the Supreme Court, challenging the validity of the search conducted without a 
search warrant.  The Court’s decision established that with probable cause, 
anything found on the suspect, or in the control of the arrestee, that is unlawful 
to possess may be seized, regardless of whether a warrant is obtained.16  The 
Court’s ruling relied heavily on the doctrine of exigent circumstances where if 
a car is mobile, there is an inherent need to preserve evidence that may be 
present in the car.17  The Carroll rule, also known as the “automobile 
exception” to the warrant requirement, has been defined and re-defined in 
several later decisions, but its basic precept of upholding the validity of a 
warrantless, probable cause search of an automobile is well delineated.  A 
subsequent case, California v. Carney, established other justifications for the 
automobile exception including the reduced expectation of privacy of a person 
because the car is in plain view to the public and drives on public streets.18 
In addition, the Court in United States v. Ross and California v. Acevedo 
has formed the fundamental foundations for the present day Fourth 
Amendment scope for searches of automobiles.19  The Ross decision involved 
the arrest of a drug suspect in a car, based on an informant’s tip.20  Following 
the arrest, the car was then driven to the police station where it was 
subsequently searched for contraband.21  In reversing the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court held that if the police have 
probable cause to search a vehicle, probable cause exists to search any 
containers in the vehicle as well.22 
This rule was further extended in California v. Acevedo.23  In Acevedo, the 
police intercepted a package in the mail containing several, wrapped marijuana 
 
 12. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 13. Id. at 135. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 134; see National Prohibition Act, infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 16. Id. at 149. 
 17. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.  “[T]he circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a 
particular auto for particular autos are most often unforeseeable; moreover the opportunity to 
search is fleeting since a car is readily moveable.”  Unites States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985). 
 18. 471 U.S. 386 (1985); see also Ross, 456 U.S. at 825. 
 19. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 20. Ross, 456 U.S. at 798. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 799. 
 23. 500 U.S. at 565. 
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packages.24  The police then allowed this same package to be delivered to the 
addressee, who brought it into his home.25  Charles Acevedo visited the 
addressee, while the police were surveying his home.26  Acevedo emerged 
from the home after approximately thirty minutes with a bag that was similar 
in size to the wrapped marijuana packages that the police earlier intercepted.27  
After Acevedo placed the package inside his trunk and began to drive off, the 
police stopped him, searched the trunk, and found the marijuana.28 
Based on these circumstances, the Court noted a dichotomy between the 
rules of Ross and the Chadwick-Sanders progeny.29  The Chadwick-Sanders 
cases instructed that where a police officer has probable cause to believe the 
object of a search is directed at a specific bag in a car, a warrant is required.30  
Therefore, as the Court notes, the confusion is directed at the conflicting 
precedents in that on one hand, in Ross, “if there is probable cause to search a 
car, then the entire car B—including any closed container found therein B—
may be searched without a warrant.”31  On the other hand, in Chadwick, “if 
there is probable cause only as to a container in the car, the container may be 
held but not searched until a warrant is obtained.”32  In reconciling these 
inconsistent rules, the Acevedo Court, with the practicality of a bright-line rule 
in mind, held that the police have the authority to search a container located 
within a car despite the fact there is no authority to search the whole car.33 
III.  WYOMING V. HOUGHTON 
A. The Facts 
Defendant-Respondent, Sandra Houghton, was a passenger in David 
Young’s car.34  Young was pulled over by two police officers for speeding and 
driving with a faulty brake light.35  While questioning Young, the officer 
noticed a hypodermic syringe in Young’s shirt pocket, at which time Young 
volunteered that the syringe was used to take drugs.36  The officer then ordered 
 
 24. Id. at 566. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 567. 
 28. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 567. 
 29. Chadwick v. U.S., 433 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 568. 
 33. Id. at 581. In conducting the search of a car, it is enough to have probable cause to 
believe the bag itself contains the object of the search. Id. 
 34. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298. 
 35. Id. at 297. 
 36. Id. at 298. 
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Houghton and a third passenger, identified only as Young’s girlfriend, out of 
the car.37  They were asked to produce some identification.38  Houghton 
claimed she did not have any and produced a pseudo-name, unbeknownst to 
the officer.39 
Based on Young’s admissions, the officers began searching the car, which 
included Houghton’s purse, which was found on the back seat.40  The police 
officer removed the wallet and found Houghton’s identification.41  Houghton 
stated that she lied to the officer “in case things went bad.”42  The officer also 
found a black “wallet type container” containing various drug paraphernalia 
including a syringe with ten cubic centimeters of methamphetamine.43 
B. The Majority’s Opinion 
The U.S. Supreme Court took the case on a writ of certiorari, subsequent to 
the Wyoming Supreme Court ruling that the police officer: 
knew or should have known that the purse did not belong to the driver, but to 
one of the passengers, [and because] there was no probable cause to search the 
passengers’ personal effects and no reason to believe that contraband had been 
placed within the purse [therefore the search of Houghton’s purse was 
illegal].44 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, who also filed a 
separate concurrence,45 rejected the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision.  The 
Court’s analysis begins by assessing the situation under the common law, at 
the time the Fourth Amendment was written.46  The Court concluded that the 
“Framers would have regarded such a search as reasonable in light of 
legislation enacted by Congress from 1789 to 1799—as well as subsequent 
legislation from the Founding Era and beyond—that empowered customs 
officials to search any ship or vessel without a warrant, if they had probable 
cause to believe that it contained goods subject to a duty.”47 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299 (quoting Houghton, 956 P.2d at 1998). 
 45. Id. at 297. 
 46. Id. at 299 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (analyzing the 
requirement under traditional common law of the “knock and announce” rule upon executing a 
search warrant)). 
 47. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300. 
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The Court then turned to an examination of the “search . . . under 
traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing . . . the degree to which a 
search intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”48 
The Court affirmed that a search is defined by the object of the search and 
the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.49  In 
its analysis, the Court distinguished the holdings of Di Re and Ybarra.50  By 
balancing the interests of the driver and the State, and not requiring 
individualized suspicion of the passenger,51 the Court viewed the police 
officer’s effectiveness as of the utmost importance.52 
The Court further gives several theories, in support of its holding that are 
not explained, nor supported through past case history, such as its reference to 
the existence of a conspiracy theory.53  The Court also asserts another 
hypothetical situation in which Aa criminal may be able to hide contraband in 
a passenger’s belongings as readily as in other containers in the car . . . [even] 
without the passenger’s knowledge or permission.54 
Ultimately, the Court’s determination rests on the need for a substantial 
rule governing the passenger’s belongings.  The majority’s decision reveals 
that it is either not confident in an officer’s ability to discern who the packages 
belong to, and it fears an increase in litigation based on individualized 
suspicion of packages in a car.55  In as much, the Court declared that “[t]he 
sensible rule . . . is that such a package may be searched, whether or not its 
owner is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it may contain the 
contraband that the officer has reason to believe is in the car.”56  Houghton and 
Young were subsequently taken into custody on felony drug charges.57 
C. Breyer’s Concurring Opinion 
 
 48. Id. at 299. 
 49. Id. at 301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824). 
 50. Id. at 301 (citing Di Re, 332 U.S. at 581); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
 51. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 313 n.4. The dissent said that the majority “crafted an imaginative 
footnote” claiming that the basis for the Di Re decision lay in the “intrusive character of the 
search” and “not on Di Re’s status as a mere occupant of the vehicle and the importance of 
individualized suspicion.”  Id. 
 52. Id. at 304 (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 390). 
 53. Id.  “A[a] car passenger, unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra, will often be 
engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the 
fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.” Id. (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-
414 (1997)) (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at 305; see Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 102 (1980). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 305. 
 57. Id. at 303. 
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The concurring opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, agreed with the 
majority’s reasoning, that “[i]f the police must establish a container’s 
ownership prior to the search of that container . . . the resulting uncertainty will 
destroy the workability of the bright-line rule set forth in” Ross.58  Despite this 
agreement, Breyer recognized a few limitations to the majority’s analysis.59  
Breyer points out that the analysis “obviously” only applies to automobile 
searches and only the search of containers in a car and not to the persons in 
that car.60 
More importantly, Justice Breyer also opines that a purse is a “special 
container,” but given that the purse was not with Houghton at the time of the 
search, any “special” privilege accorded to the container is lost.61  Breyer 
stated that had Houghton kept her purse with her, the purse “like a man’s 
billfold . . . might amount to a kind of outer clothing which under the Court’s 
cases would properly receive increased protection.”62 
D. The Dissenting Opinion 
Finally, Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter and 
Ginsberg,63 took issue with several of the underlying principles of the 
majority’s decision.  In his opinion, Stevens sees no difference between the 
intrusion in the Di Re decision where there was a search of the individual’s 
pockets and the search of Houghton’s purse.64  The lack of comparison 
between these containers is emphasized in the Ross decision, where the 
majority finds its basis.65  There the search was defined by the object of the 
search and not the place where the object was found; therefore, there is no need 
to differentiate between containers.66  Finally, in balancing the private interests 
versus the need for effective law enforcement, Stevens disagrees with the 
 
 58. Id. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. at 308. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 (citing Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587). Although it may be true that 
the if the purse was with Houghton may constitute outer clothing, Justice Breyer recognized that 
all searches are not foreclosed, as the police may still perform a “limited search of the outer 
clothing” for weapons.  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). 
 63. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 309. 
 65. Id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824). 
 66. In Ross, “[w]e. . .disapproved of a possible container based distinction between a an’s 
pocket and a woman’s pocketbook.  Ironically while we concluded in Ross that ‘probable cause to 
believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not 
justify a search of the entire cab, the rule the Court fashions would apparently permit a 
warrantless search of a passenger’s briefcase if there is probable cause to believe the taxidriver 
had a syringe somewhere in his vehicle.”  Id. (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824). 
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majority’s lack of confidence in the police to make individualized probable 
cause determinations.67 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This analysis sets out to dispel the majority’s opinion in accordance with 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion,68 the opinion of the Wyoming Supreme 
Court,69 and recent case history.  Under the traditional automobile exception 
and the Fourth Amendment, the Houghton decision contradicts established 
case law. 
A. Inconsistencies With Past Decisions 
In Carroll, Ross, Acevedo, and the plethora of other automobile exception 
doctrine cases, several factually distinguishable elements were found to pertain 
to the search of a driver’s belongings inside the car with no reference to a 
passenger or the passenger’s individual interests.  Furthermore the Court does 
not set tangible limits on the scope of the search, as the factual situations did 
not present themselves for such a limitation.  These boundaries are foretold 
briefly in Ross where it states: “the scope of a warrantless search based on 
probable cause is not narrower—and no broader—than the scope of a search 
authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.”70  This inevitably begs 
the question of whether the scope of a warrantless search of a car includes the 
personal belongings of a passenger or a guest?71 
1. The Carroll Rule 
One of the fundamental problems of the Court’s treatment of Houghton 
lies in the Carrol decision—the foundation for the automobile exception.72  
The legality of the seizure of alcohol in Carrol was the result of the 
promulgation of the National Prohibition Act.  Section 26, title 2 of the Act, in 
pertinent part states: 
When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law 
shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, 
intoxicating liquors in any . . . automobile . . . or other vehicle, it shall be his 
duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported 
contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating liquors being transported or possessed 
 
 67. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 306 n.2. 
 68. Id. at 309-13. 
 69. Houghton, 956 P.2d at 363. 
 70. Houghton, 956 P.2d at 366 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 823); see also State v. Kelly, 268 
P. 571 (Wyo.App. 1928) (holding that a court should be satisfied that probable cause exists before 
a search is allowed). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. 
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illegally shall be seized by an officer, he shall take possession of the 
vehicle . . . or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge 
therein.73 
From the Prohibition Act is passage the automobile exception to search an 
automobile based on probable cause was born. The passage is limited, 
however, to the driver, as evidenced by a strict reading of the end of the 
paragraph.74  Since the founding of the automobile exception is statutorily 
limited to the driver of the car, the Supreme Court’s extension of the 
automobile exception to passengers in the present case is therefore misplaced. 
2. Individual Rights 
A “Terry” stop and frisk was established as a narrow exception to the 
Fourth Amendment to allow police officers to conduct a limited, protective 
search for weapons.75  This doctrine aids the law enforcement officer in 
securing himself from unnecessary harm if the officer reasonably believes he is 
in such danger.76  If the officer conducts a search beyond the narrow limits of 
Terry, the search becomes a search for evidence and is subject to the probable 
cause standard.  If this is the case, it must be remembered that probable cause 
must be individualized and cannot be based on the existence of probable cause 
to search another on the premises.77 
The starting point for an analysis of the rights of passengers as the Terry 
and probable cause standards are applied, lies in two Supreme Court cases: 
U.S. v. Di Re78 and Ybarra v. Illinois.79  In Ybarra, the police executed a valid 
search warrant against the proprietor of a bar and the bar itself, but carried the 
 
 73. 42 Stat. 222, 223, c. 134, §26, title 2 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923) (repealed 1933) 
(emphasis added). 
 74. “But even the National Prohibition Act did not direct the arrest of all occupants but only 
of the person in charge of the offending vehicle, though there is better reason to assume that no 
passenger in a car loaded with liquor would remain innocent of knowledge of the car’s cargo than 
to assume that a passenger must know what pieces of paper are carried in the pockets of the 
driver.”  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 313 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 586-
87). 
 75. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. 
 76. Id.; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).  “The Court stressed the limits of 
it holding: the police officer’s belief that his safety or that of others is in danger must be 
objectively reasonable - based on reasonable inferences from known facts—so that it can be 
tested at the appropriate time by ‘the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge and the extent of 
the intrusion must be carefully tailored to the rationale justifying it.”  Id. at 210 n.11. 
 77. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91. 
 78. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 581 (finding invalid a search of a defendant where he was present 
inside a car when an arrest of the driver was made, in which a subsequent search of his person 
produced contraband on defendant). 
 79. Ybarra, supra note 51. 
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search too far when the bar’s patrons were personally searched.80  In reversing 
Ybarra’s conviction, the Court held that the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect the legitimate expectations of persons, not places.81  
Therefore it would not have mattered if Ybarra was in a bar or some other 
place because the protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a 
personal right, not defined by one’s location. 
Furthermore, the Di Re decision condemns the search of a person for 
merely being in a car where probable cause existed.82  Michael Di Re, a 
passenger in a car, was convicted of knowingly possessing gasoline ration 
coupons in violation of the Second War Powers Act of 1942.83  The police 
searched the car pursuant to an informant’s tip pertaining only to Buttita’s, the 
driver’s, counterfeit coupons.84  The police subsequently searched Buttitta, Di 
Re, and the informant, Reed, who was in the back seat of the car.85  Di Re was 
found to have ration coupons during a search of his body, after he was taken to 
the police station and told to empty his pockets.86  The Court concluded that 
there was an unjustified search given the absence of probable cause to search 
his person.87  This determination was based on the notion that one “by mere 
presence in a suspected car, [does not lose] immunities of his person to which 
he would otherwise be entitled.”88  The Court disallowed searches of one’s 
person on anything less than probable cause, regardless of whether one is a 
passenger in a car, but the Court failed to extend the decision into the question 
of privacy interests in a passenger’s belongings because the issue was not 
presented before the Court. 
Following the Ybarra and Di Re decisions the Ross decision which is 
authored by Stevens noted that the scope of the search is defined by the “object 
of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it 
may be found.”89  It must be remembered that Ross was factually limited to the 
case where was only one person in the car who was searched, following an 
informant’s tip.90 
Stevens’ dissent in Houghton emphasizes that the Houghton majority 
misconstrues Stevens’ own majority opinion in Ross, because the Houghton 
 
 80. Id. at 90. 
 81. Id. at 91. 
 82. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 583-87. 
 83. Id. at 583. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 585. 
 88. Id. at 230; see Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62 (finding that persons in a parked car are no less 
likely than those sitting elsewhere “to have been talking about the World Series,” which is not 
suspicious by itself). 
 89. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 310 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824) (emphasis added). 
 90. Ross, 456 U.S. at 799. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] WYOMING V. HOUGHTON 517 
Court’s application of Ross merely limits the scope of the search to the “object 
of the search.”91  Stevens also stated that the scope of the search is also limited 
by the place “in where there is probable cause to believe that [the object] may 
be found.”  Stevens’ dissent undermines the majority’s distinction of the Di Re 
decision of being merely limited to searching one’s person.92  When 
superimposing Stevens’ interpretation of Ross on the Di Re and Ybarra cases, 
where there is no probable cause to search a person’s container including his 
pockets, despite an officer’s close proximity to the accused, there is no valid 
search. 
Applying this axiom to Houghton, the search of Houghton’s purse was 
misguided.  Similar to Di Re, the only basis for the officer’s probable cause 
was Houghton’s proximity to Young, and not any individualized suspicion.  
There was no reason to suspect “foul play,” nor was there reason to suspect 
that “the object of the search” was present in Houghton’s belongings;93 
therefore, there was no probable cause to believe the any drugs were in 
Houghton’s bag. 
3. Other Flaws 
There are also a number of other flaws with the majority’s decision in 
Houghton.  Justice Scalia’s opinion argues that the Di Re decision is 
distinguishable from the present case because Houghton’s purse was simply 
not part of her clothing; thus Houghton was not subject to the same intrusion 
that Di Re was exposed to with a search of his body.94  Justice Breyer 
recognized the inherit flaw in this proposition. The search of the purse could 
have been invalidated by Houghton simply keeping possession of the purse.  
Justice Scalia actually brings this dilemma upon himself in a footnote where he 
attempts to undermine Justice Stevens’ dissent.  Scalia stated that Aif the 
dissent thinks pockets and clothing do not count as part of the person, it must 
believe that the only searches of the person are strip searches.95  Recognizing 
the Court’s reluctance to distinguish between different kinds of containers, 
Justice Breyer stated “it would not matter if a woman’s purse, like a man’s 
billfold, were attached to her person. The purse might then amount to a kind of 
‘outer clothing’ which under the Court’s cases [i.e., Di Re] would properly 
receive increased protection.”96 
If Houghton was in possession of her purse, the only means for a search to 
be legally carried out on Houghton would have been pursuant to the automatic 
 
 91. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 310 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824). 
 92. The majority interprets Di Re to require separate probable cause to search a car 
passenger’s body, but not separate probable cause to search a passenger’s belongings. Id. at 303. 
 93. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 113. 
 94. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303. 
 95. Id. at n.1. 
 96. Id. at 308 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
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companion rule.  The courts of appeals have debated the extent of this doctrine 
as it applies to pat-downs of an arrestee’s companion.97  Despite the fact that 
the basic issue of search incident to an arrest,98 which the automatic companion 
rule is premised on is directly inapplicable to the Houghton case as there was 
no arrest of the driver, Young,99 the relevance requires a further examination of 
individualized suspicion.  The automatic companion rule, adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit following Terry, established a bright-line rule that an officer is entitled 
to do a protective search of an arrestee’s companion based solely on that 
individual’s relationship with the arrestee.100  The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Circuits have since rejected this rule and instead adopted a “totality of the 
circumstances test,” that would only allow a search of the companion based on 
reasonable suspicion, consistent with the Terry doctrine.101  Consequently, 
“where there is a valid search incident to an arrest, [case law does] not support 
the proposition that the search of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile . . . extends to passengers in a car driven by one who is being 
arrested pursuant to a warrant.”102 
Despite the relatively high level of disagreement among the Courts of 
Appeals, the Supreme Court has yet to act directly on the issue.  Instead, the 
Court has faceted general limitations in order to maintain the “narrow scope” 
of Terry.103  The best example of this is in Ybarra where the Court refused to 
 
 97. See Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158 (Wy. 1996).  The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted 
the automatic companion rule but a dissent was filed claiming “[t]he automatic companion rule 
replaces the fine line of the Terry reasonable suspicion requirement with a broad brush, rendering 
virtually any search of an arrestee’s companions reasonable.”  Id. at 1167. 
 98. See supra note 9. 
 99. Houghton, 956 P.2d at 370 n.5. 
 100. Jeanne C. Serocke, The Automatic Companion Rule, An Appropriate Standard to Justify 
The Terry Frisk of an Arrestee’s Companion?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 924 (1988); see United 
States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that under the “bright-line” test that the 
officer had the right to do a protective search of Vaughan, after the arrest of the driver, but the 
officer exceeded his authority by searching the contents of Vaughan’s briefcase); United States v. 
Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971) (the court affirmed a search an automatic search after 
stopping the arrestee’s car on an arrest warrant for postal violations, the officer also searched the 
wife, but the court said the officer went too far when searching the woman’s purse, as being a 
reasonable place for a weapon). 
 101. Id.; see United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to follow 
Berryhill) (finding that an automobile passenger should not automatically be subject to a pat 
down search, but the propriety of such a search depends on the “totality of the circumstances”); 
United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 102. Commonweath v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, 131 (Pa. 1995) (quoting Bell, 762 F.2d at 499 
n.5). 
 103. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).  “The Court stressed the 
limits of it holding: the police officer’s belief that his safety or that of others is ion danger must 
be objectively reasonable—based on reasonable inferences from known facts—so that it can be 
tested at the appropriate time by ‘the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge’ and the extent of 
the intrusion must be carefully tailored to the rationale justifying it.”  Id. at 210 n.11. 
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uphold the protective frisk of a customer in a bar, where there was no basis for 
any suspicion other than presence in the bar.104  In addition, given the Court’s 
attempt to distinguish Di Re, finding that the a search of a person is highly 
intrusive when balanced against the interests of the law enforcement officer,105 
it is doubtful that the Court would ever uphold a search of the passenger, where 
the driver is arrested and there is no reasonable suspicion to search the 
passenger. 
B. A Better Method of Dealing With the Situation 
1. Traditional Search Warrant Tests as Applied to Visitors 
The various states and federal circuits have developed three distinct tests 
governing probable cause searches of the belongings of a visitor, pursuant to a 
search warrant.106  Each test supports the notion of individualized suspicion, 
although none of the tests have been adopted by the Supreme Court. 
a. The Physical Proximity Test 
Courts have based the validity of a search of a guest’s belongings on his or 
her physical possession of the object that is searched, at the time the search is 
executed.107  The court in Teller upheld a search and seizure of the contents of 
a woman’s purse pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of the premises.108  
But this rule has been criticized in other jurisdictions109 because courts have 
found that an individual assumes an expectation of privacy in their purses or 
 
 104. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93. 
 105. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303.  “Even a limited search of the outer clothing. . .constitutes a 
severe though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be annoying, 
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25). 
 106. Houghton, 956 P.2d at 367. 
 107. United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968) 
(finding a valid search was conducted where a woman entered her home during the execution of a 
search warrant and placed her purse down on the foot of her bed where it was subsequently 
searched and illicit drugs were found); see Walker v. U.S., 327 F.2d 597 (D.C. 1963), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 956 (1963) (holding that a defendant’s purse found on a bed was considered 
another household item, allowed to be searched with in the scope of the warrant); Commonwealth 
v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 1988) (finding it would neither be practical to have police 
officers in the execution of a search warrant to ask individuals who the various items belong to, 
nor would it be reasonable to expect an honest response). 
 108. Id. at 497. 
 109. United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973).  These jurisdictions determined 
that the “extent a recognizable personal effect not currently worn, but apparently temporarily put 
down, such as a briefcase, falls outside the scope of a warrant to search the premises, we would 
be better advised to examine the relationship between the person and the place.”  Id. at 432. 
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wallets placed next to them.110  “The practical result of such a rule may be to 
encourage the government to obtain search warrants for places frequented by 
suspicious individuals, such as infamous bars, then lie in wait for those 
individuals to enter and make themselves comfortable.”111 
b. The Relationship Test 
An alternative and less criticized analysis is the relationship test which 
examines the relationship between the owner of the personal property and the 
place to be searched.  In this test, an individual is considered to have a separate 
interest in his or her property as a mere visitor; therefore, the visitor will not be 
subject to a search warrant.112  This rule is faceted on the premise that a search 
warrant establishes “a protective boundary . . . [which] encompasses those 
extensions of a person which he reasonably seeks to preserve as private, 
regardless of where he may be.”113 
In Bonds v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a search of a purse 
pursuant to a “no-knock” warrant to search a suspected drug dealer’s home.114  
The warrant was obtained after observation of the premises and tips from an 
informant.115  Upon executing the warrant, the police searched the defendants 
purse.116  The court found that the search of the purse was valid as there was a 
“nexus between [the defendant] and the criminal activity which gave rise to the 
warrant.”117 
c. The Notice Test 
The Wyoming notice test appears to be the most logical of the tests 
enumerated by the Wyoming Supreme Court.  It is a common assertion of the 
law that a police officer does not have a duty to inquire into the ownership of 
property where the search is being executed.118  This test allows officers to 
 
 110. Id. at 432; State v. Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (Orme, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the physical proximity test). 
 111. Id. at 431. 
 112. Id.; United States v. Gray, 814 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1987) (the prevailing circumstances 
of the search suggested that the officers could have been aware at the time of the search that the 
defendant was not a mere visitor or passerby since it appeared that he resided on the premises); 
United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 113. Id. at 432.  “The Fourth Amendment protects people not places.”  Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 114. 372 S.E.2d 448 (Ga.Ct.App. 1988). 
 115. Id. at 450. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 452 (emphasis added). 
 118. Carman v. State, 602 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1979) (finding no notice of the purse 
belonging to the visitor because there was a woman living on the premises); Commonwealth v. 
Reese, 549 A.2d 909 (Pa. 1988) (finding it to be unreasonable to require police officers who are 
executing a warrant to inquire as to the ownership of the personal property).  Id. at 911.; State v. 
Wills, 524 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Houghton, 956 P.2d at 368; State v. Nabarro, 525 
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assume that all containers on the premises (or for the purpose of this note: in 
the car) can be searched unless the officer knows or should know that the 
container belongs to one that is not subject or within the realm of the probable 
cause of the search.119  “The notice test provides clear guidance and can be 
quickly implemented in an emergency situation, but does not necessarily 
abrogate individualized Fourth Amendment protection.”120  A widely accepted 
version of this test is California’s McCabe test.121  The court allowed police, 
while executing a search warrant, to search the visitor and his effects on the 
assumption that the effects belong to the owner of the premises, where: (1) the 
visitor’s personal items might serve as a plausible repository for the object of 
the search, unless officers know the property belongs to the visitor; (2) the 
officers know the property belongs to the visitor, they may not rely on the 
authority conferred by the search warrant even though it is plausible repository 
for the contraband; and (3) someone within the premises has had the 
opportunity to conceal the contraband within the personal effects of the visitor 
immediately prior to the execution of the search warrant, officers may 
nonetheless conduct the search.122 
An example of this can be found in Hayes v. State.123  There the police 
executed a search warrant for “Mark,” who owned the residence.124  The only 
person in the home, however, was the defendant, who was asleep on the couch, 
while the rest of the beds were made.125  Without inquiring into the defendant’s 
identity, the police searched the suitcase next to where he was sleeping.126  
Illegal drugs were found in the suitcase,127 but the court concluded that a 
search of the defendant was inconsistent with any belief that the defendant was 
a resident.128 
 
P.2d 573 (Haw. 1974).  “[W]ithout notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, the 
police are entitled to assume that all objects within the premises lawfully subject to search under a 
warrant are a part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant.”  Id. at 577. 
 119. Id. at 370. 
 120. Houghton, 956 P.2d at 370. 
 121. People v. McCabe, 192 Cal.Rptr. 635, 636-37 (Cal. App. 1983). 
 122. Id.; State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (affirming the McCabe 
rule where upon entering a residence to execute a search warrant, there was no opportunity for the 
defendant to hide cocaine in a purse, belonging to the only female on the premises, therefore the 
search of the purse was illegal under the “notice test”); State v. Nabarro, 525 P.2d 573 (Haw. 
1974); State v. Kurtz, 612 P.2d 749 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Houghton, 956 P.2d at 368. 
 123. 234 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). 
 124. Id. at 361. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id 
 128. Hayes, 234 S.E.2d at 363. 
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2. Application of the Tests to Houghton 
The Wyoming Supreme Court was correct to invoke the notice test in its 
application to passengers in automobiles129 because its ruling more closely 
parallels the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior conclusions.  One such notion is “the 
proper scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause [should be] ‘no 
broader’ than the proper scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported 
by probable cause.”130  There is no reason to believe that a search authorized 
by a warrant, because of Young possession of the drugs would extend to a 
search of Houghton’s belongings, other then being in the same automobile as 
the one who possesses the drugs.  In addition, it should be remembered that 
because one is dealing with an automobile, an automobile is not a “talisman” 
for abandoning individual rights.131  The Court should keep in mind that the 
distinguishing feature of the criminal justice system necessitates “principled, 
accountable decision making in individual cases,”132 which bright line rules 
eliminate.133 
In addition, the notice test complies with the Supreme Court’s basic 
precepts under the automobile exception’s balancing test of weighing the 
effectiveness and safety of the police against individual rights.134  These 
considerations will not be hindered by utilizing the notice test.  The test will 
yield an assumption that every piece of property will still be able to be 
searched, absent the officer knowing or has reason to know that the bag does 
belong to the suspect.  Therefore the passenger’s interests are protected by 
applying the traditional warrant requirements which would prevent an overly 
 
 129. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s application of the notice test seems to be the first time 
this test has been applied to automobiles.  But since Wyoming has handed down its opinion in 
Houghton, the Washington Supreme Court has again used a similar analysis.  See State v. Parker, 
987 P.2d 73, 82 (Wa. 1999). 
 130. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 312 (quoting Ross 456 U.S. at 825).  “By a parity of reasoning 
with that on which the government disclaims the right to search occupants of a house, we suppose 
the government would not contend that if it had a valid search warrant for the car only it could 
search the occupants as an incident to its execution.  How then could we say that the right to 
search a car without a warrant confers greater latitude to search occupants than a search by 
warrant would permit?”  Houghton, 526 U.S. at 312 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587). 
 131. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 234 U.S. 49, 57 (1973); Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (“[T]he 
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his safety of that of others was in danger.”). 
 132. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d at 113 (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 422 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
 133. Id.; see also Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 558 (Wyo. 1992) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) 
(advocating under the Wyoming State Constitution, independent review instead of a bright-line 
rule); see also State v. Webster, 824 P.2d 768 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (Livermore, J., dissenting) 
(finding that the seizure of passengers, as to whether they should remain in the car or not, requires 
an individual determination based on the circumstances). 
 134. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300. 
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eager officer from taking advantage of the automobile exception, while forcing 
the officer to make accountable decisions depending on the situation. 
Also, the Court’s fear that the absence of a bright line rule would cause a 
proliferation of litigation135 is short-sighted.  Realistically speaking, most 
defendants challenge searches in order to exclude evidence.  The notice test 
may in fact aid in easing a courts’ dockets by excluding a limited number of 
ill-advised searches, instead of condoning a cavernous right to search.  In the 
end the notice test will not be a bright line rule but closer to a fairly-bright line 
test. 
Where individual decision making is applied to Houghton, the notice test 
would dictate a practical result as an individual’s interests are safeguarded 
while still protecting the efficiency of the police search.  In Houghton’s 
situation, she would be afforded this protection because there was no reason to 
suspect that her purse belonged to Young.  Using the McCabe Test one 
observes: (1) that while the purse may “serve as a plausible repository of the 
object of the search”; (2) using common sense the officer should be on notice, 
and in fact “acknowledged that [the bag] was a ‘lady’s purse’ and that ‘men do 
not carry purses;’”136 and (3) there was no “reason to believe”137 someone had 
the opportunity to conceal any contraband in the purse.138  Therefore, the 
search of her purse and the fruits of the search should be suppressed. 
The other tests, the proximity and relationship tests, are admittedly 
unworkable standards under the automobile exception.  The proximity test, 
would merely require a passenger to grab the object of the search as a police 
officer detains the driver on a routine traffic stop, and in turn claim an 
expectation of privacy over the container; therefore, the effectiveness of the 
police would be hindered.  Furthermore, the relationship test is also impractical 
in application to automobiles since its basic precepts involve the persons 
relationship to the suspect and the place to be searched.  The relationship test 
would cause the counter result from the proximity test, where essentially 
everyone in a car could be searched.  This arises because the officer, and for 
that matter the Court, could assume that the driver and the passenger were 
engaged in a “common enterprise.” 
 
 135. Id. at 303. 
 136. Houghton, 956 P.2d at 370. 
 137. Id. 
 138. The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that the prosecution went out of its way to prove 
that nothing could have been placed in Houghton’s purse based on Houghton’s claim as part of 
her defense that one of the wallets found in the purse did not belong to her.  Houghton, 956 P.2d 
at 371. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
As the principles of the basic doctrines are misconstrued by the Court, 
one’s rights are continually being narrowed as the Court is trying to assert an 
interest in the efficiency of the police.  Applying the notice test provides a safe 
balance, which helps to protect the concerns of the Court while applying 
reasoned judgement. In the words of Justice Stevens in his dissent in Wilson, 
one can only surmise “[h]ow far this ground breaking decision will take us . . . 
I fear, however, that it may pose a more serious threat to individual liberty than 
the Court realizes.”139  One can only hope that the Court revisits the issue in 
the near future in order to reaffirm the protections of the Constitution and to 
safeguard the rights of your spouse and child. 
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